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Take Two: The Fifth Circuit’s Interpretation of the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act in United States v. CITGO
INTRODUCTION
Imagine yourself working on an oil rig, watching pelicans and ducks
fly into uncovered oil tanks and eventually die from drowning, exhaustion,
or the effects of ingested oil. You have informed your supervisor of the
problem and have suggested that the company cover the tanks; however,
the tanks remain uncovered and these magnificent birds continue to die.
Further, after discussing the situation with your supervisor to no avail, you
are now forced to clean these tanks. In doing so, you find bird bones and
debris clog your vacuum equipment.
Unfortunately, the fact pattern described above is not a
hypothetical. Rather, it is the unfortunate set of facts in United States v.
CITGO1—a case where the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
CITGO Petroleum Corporation’s (CITGO) conviction for violating the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918 (MBTA).2 Although the MBTA makes
it illegal “at any time, by any means or in any manner,”3 to kill protected
birds, U.S. courts have allowed this sort of irresponsible activity from
corporate actors such as CITGO.4
The MBTA has been the topic of a federal circuit split since the 1970s.
Two circuits have held that the MBTA applies to accidental killings by
corporate actors.5 In contrast, three circuits, the most recent being the Fifth
Circuit, have held that the MBTA is limited to deliberate acts committed
against migratory birds, such as hunting and poaching.6
The importance and scope of the MBTA and CITGO cannot be
understated. The MBTA affects a number of industries, mainly energy,
which are vital to Fifth Circuit states. In fact, there are nearly fifty oil
refineries between Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.7 Moreover, Texas
leads the country in the wind energy industry, with over 10,000 wind
Copyright 2017, by JOHN P. GRAF.
1. 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 2015).
2. 16 U.S.C. § 703 et. seq (2012).
3. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a) (2012).
4. See generally CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
5. See e.g., United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978); United
States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
6. See e.g., Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991);
Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997);
CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
7. Number and Capacity of Petroleum Refineries, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN.
(June 19, 2015), http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pnp_cap1_dcu_nus_a.htm
[https://perma.cc/FTF9-ZRMP].
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turbines installed.8 Both of these energy industries pose threats to
migratory birds and have been subject to convictions under the MBTA.9
The Fifth Circuit’s holding in CITGO is incorrect. It misconstrues the
text of the MBTA and is inconsistent with the holdings of other circuits
which found the MBTA applicable to accidental killings and takings by
commercial actors. Further, the MBTA should be interpreted to apply to
accidental killings and takings by corporate actors.
This case note will first discuss the background of the MBTA. Next,
it will analyze how accidental killings of protected birds have been
adjudicated under the MBTA in federal courts and will explain why the
Fifth Circuit’s ruling in CITGO is flawed. Then, it will discuss why the
MBTA should be interpreted to apply to accidental killings of birds by
corporate actors, and will explore administrative and judicial means of
accomplishing this goal.
I. BACKGROUND: WHAT IS THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT?
The MBTA arose from a treaty between the United States and Great
Britain, acting on behalf of Canada.10 This treaty aimed to create a
“uniform system of protection” for migratory birds that navigate between
the United States and Canada.11 The MBTA was amended to implement
subsequent treaties among the United States, Mexico, Japan, and the
former Soviet Union (now Russia).12
The MBTA states that “it shall be unlawful at any time, by any means
or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take,
capture, or kill, possess . . . ” any migratory bird.13 The MBTA conveys a
strict liability standard for misdemeanor violations, which include the
accidental killing and taking of protected birds.14

8. U.S. Wind Energy State Facts, AM. WIND ENERGY ASSOC., http://www.awea
.org/resources/statefactsheets.aspx?itemnumber=890 [https://perma.cc/GJ5Q-4CNB]
(2016).
9. See infra Section II: The Circuit Split; See also United States v. Duke
Energy Renewables, Inc., No. 2:13-cr-00268, 2013 BL (D. Wyo., Nov. 22, 2013).
10. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the
Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916,U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702.
11. Id.
12. 16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
13. 16 U.S.C. § 703.
14. Id. In contrast, felony MBTA convictions require the government to prove a
defendant knowingly acted in violation of the MBTA. 16 U.S.C. § 707(b) (2016); See
e.g., United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997). Since most of the
controversy over MBTA convictions arise from accidental and unintentional killings,
the scope of this article only addresses convictions of misdemeanor violations of the
MBTA.
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The MBTA, like similar environmental protection laws, acts as a
foundation upon which implementing regulations build upon.15 For
example, take is not defined in the MBTA. However, regulations
implementing the MBTA define take to mean “pursue, hunt, shoot, wound,
kill, trap, capture, or collect, or attempt to pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill,
trap, capture, or collect” a migratory bird.16
The MBTA grants the Secretary of the Interior power to enforce the
MBTA.17 In turn, the Secretary of Interior delegates enforcement to the
Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).18 Consequently, FWS has much
discretion in who it charges with MBTA violations. Traditionally, the
MBTA was intended to combat market hunters’ excessive exploitation of
game and non-game birds during the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.19 The MBTA has been successful in reducing over-exploitation
driven by activities such as hunting and poaching.20 For instance, most
waterfowl populations are either stable or increasing as a direct result of
the MBTA.21
Today, migratory birds face a number of different threats beyond
simply excessive hunting.22 A 2002 FWS study identified the leading
causes of bird mortality23 in the United States to be: building window
strikes (estimated 97 to 976 million bird deaths per year); communications
towers (4 to 5 million deaths per year); high tension transmission and
power lines (up to 174 million deaths per year); impacts with vehicles (60
million deaths or more per year); and pesticide poisoning (at least 72
million deaths per year).24 Newer studies estimate that wind farms kill as
15. See Larry Martin Corcoran & Elinor Colbourn, Shocked, Crushed and
Poisoned: Criminal Enforcement in Non-Hunting Cases Under the Migratory
Bird Treaties, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 359, 370 (1999).
16. 50 C.F.R. § 10.12 (2016).
17. 16 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
18. 50 C.F.R. § 10.1 (2016).
19. See Andrew G. Ogden, Dying for A Solution: Incidental Taking Under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 38 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 5 (2013).
20. See Conrad A. Fjetland, Possibilities for Expansion of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act for the Protection of Migratory Birds, 40 NAT. RES. J. 47, 48 (2000).
21. See U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., OFFICE OF MIGRATORY BIRD MGMT.,
WATERFOWL POPULATION STATUS (2015) (noting the FWS estimated there were
approximately 49.5 million breeding ducks in the traditional survey area, which
is 43% above the 1955–2014 long-term average).
22. David Sibley, Causes of Bird Mortality, SIBLEY GUIDES (Jan. 15, 2010),
http://www.sibleyguides.com/conservation/causes-of-bird-mortality [https://perma
.cc/2CMY-D2WY] (last updated July 18, 2016).
23. Behind habitat loss and degradation.
24. U.S. FISH & W ILDLIFE SERV., M IGRATORY B IRD MORTALITY: MANY
H UMAN -C AUSED T HREATS A FFLICT O UR B IRD P OPULATIONS (2002), http:
//digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1363&context=usfwspubs
[https://perma.cc/83D6-AFPG].
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many as 368,000 birds annually,25 and oil field production “skim pits”26
and wastewater disposal facilities kill between 500,000 to 1 million birds
annually.27
When the MBTA was adopted in 1918, the government could not
anticipate the impact modern technology would have on the migratory bird
population. In the early 1970s, the federal government began prosecuting
companies for incidental takings other than the traditional MBTA
violations of hunting and poaching.28 The federal government continues to
prosecute companies for takings of migratory birds; however, federal
courts are split on: (1) whether the MBTA applies to accidental takings,
and (2) if the MBTA applies, the scope of prohibited activity. The
underlying issue driving the circuit split is whether the MBTA applies to
commercial actors who accidently or indirectly kill or take birds.
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: “NOW, LET’S SAY YOU AND I GO TOE-TO-TOE ON
BIRD LAW AND SEE WHO COMES OUT THE VICTOR?”29
Before the Fifth Circuit handed down the CITGO decision in
September 2015, federal appellate courts were evenly split in their
application of the MBTA. While the Second and Tenth Circuits held that

25. Trevor Hughes, Officials Crack Down on Wind Farms that Kill Birds, Bats,
USATODAY (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2015/
01/29/bird-deaths-wind-turbines/21358155/ [https://perma.cc/Q36W-TE24].
26. A skim pit is a pit dug in the ground used to separate oil from produced water
using gravity-separation. Migratory birds are attracted to oil field production skim pits
by mistaking them for natural bodies of water. U.S. FISH & W ILDLIFE SERV.,
CONTAMINANT ISSUES-OIL FIELD WASTE P ITS, http://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/contaminants/contaminants1e.html [https://perma.cc/4ZLS-ZBUL] (last
visited Aug. 28, 2016).
27. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., MIGRATORY BIRD MORTALITY IN OILFIELD
WASTEWATER DISPOSAL FACILITIES (May 2009), http://www.fws.gov/mountainprairie/contaminants/documents/COWDFBirdMortality.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SLCBB4F].
28. See George Cameron Coggins & Sebastian T. Patti, The Resurrection and
Expansion of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 50 U. COLO. L. REV. 165, 183–85
(1979). 16 U.S.C. § 703 makes it illegal to do the following to any migratory bird:
pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess,
offer for sale, sell, offer to barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase,
deliver for shipment, ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported,
or imported, deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be
transported, carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export . . . .
29. It’s Always Sunny in Philadelphia: The Gang Exploits the Mortgage
Crisis (FX Network broadcast Sept. 17, 2009).
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the MBTA applies to accidental takings by commercial actors,30 the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits held that the MBTA does not apply.31
A. The Second and Tenth Circuits
The Second Circuit was first to address the applicability of the MBTA
to accidental takings in the 1978 case United States v. FMC Corp.32 In
FMC Corp., the Second Circuit upheld a conviction for killing migratory
birds. The defendant was engaged in the “extrahazardous” activity of
manufacturing pesticides and failed to prevent the dangerous chemicals
from accruing in a wastewater storage pond.33 As a result, migratory birds
landed in the storage ponds and died of pesticide poisoning.34 Ultimately,
the court found it appropriate to uphold strict liability for killings under
the MBTA, even though the defendant was unaware of the harm caused,
because the defendant was engaged in an “extrahazardous” activity.35
In 2010, the Tenth Circuit similarly upheld misdemeanor convictions for
the death of migratory birds caught in oil production equipment.36 In United
States v. Apollo Energies,37 the court held that a misdemeanor violation of the
MBTA is a strict liability crime since the “take” provision of the Act does not
contain a knowledge requirement.38 Furthermore, the court held that the
MBTA is not unconstitutionally vague.39 The court explained that although
the MBTA criminalizes a wide range of conduct, the law explicitly makes it
illegal to “pursue, hunt, take, capture, [and] kill . . . ” protected migratory
birds.40 Since the defendants had fair notice of what constituted a MBTA
violation, the court held the statute was not unconstitutionally vague.41
Apollo involved the prosecution of two defendants. FWS put the first
defendant, Apollo Energies, on notice that their equipment could trap and
kill migratory birds.42 The Tenth Circuit upheld MBTA convictions only
for conduct that occurred after the FWS provided notice that the activity
could be a proximate cause of bird injuries.43 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
30. See supra note 5.
31. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 112 (8th
Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
32. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
33. Id. at 907.
34. Id. at 904–05.
35. Id. at 907.
36. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 689 (10th Cir. 2010).
37. 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
38. Id. at 686.
39. Id. at 688–89.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 691.
43. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 691 (10th Cir. 2010).
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reasoned that criminalizing acts that were not reasonably foreseen to effect
birds would stretch the MBTA to its “constitutional breaking point.”44 The
court clarified that the “foreseeability” required is the foreseeability that one’s
equipment could harm migratory birds.45 Because Apollo Energies had
received notice of its equipment killing birds for nearly eighteen months
before the bird death resulting in its conviction occurred; it knew its
equipment could (and did) proximately cause bird deaths.46 The second
defendant, Walker, was not made aware that its equipment could injure birds,
and no reasonable person would conclude the equipment would lead to the
deaths of migratory birds. Therefore, Walker’s conviction was reversed.47
B. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits
In Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans,48 the Ninth Circuit considered
whether timber sales that would destroy a suitable habitat for the northern
spotted owl amounted to a taking under section 703 of the MBTA.49 In
declining to extend the MBTA to an activity that would “indirectly” lead
to bird deaths, the court stated “[h]abitat destruction causes ‘harm’ to the
owls under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) but does not ‘take’ them
within the meaning of the MBTA.”50 The Ninth Circuit distinguished
between the ESA and the MBTA’s definition of take, noting the ESA’s
definition of take included the word harm, which was further defined to
include “significant habitat modification or degradation where it actually
kills or injures wildlife.”51 Furthermore, the only cases that had found
liability under the MBTA reached as far as “direct, though unintended,”
bird killings from pesticide poisoning.52
In Newton Country Wildlife Associations v. U.S. Forest Service,53 the
Eighth Circuit also found that timber sales did not violate the MBTA.54 In
Newton, the Newton County Wildlife Association (NCWA) sued the
United States Forest Service (USFS), alleging MBTA violations in four
44. Id. at 690.
45. Id. at 690 n.5 (quoting “We emphasize that ‘foreseeability’ in the proximate
cause sense is not foreseeability of a legal rule . . . Due process constrains the
criminalization of predicate acts that do not foreseeably result in a danger that is
criminal—here, the taking of protected birds.”).
46. Id. at 691.
47. Id.
48. 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
49. Id. at 302.
50. Id. at 303.
51. Id. (citing 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (2012)) (internal citations omitted).
52. Id. (referring to United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978)).
53. 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir. 1997).
54. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 116 (8th
Cir. 1997).
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timber sales.55 Particularly, the NCWA argued that the logging necessary
for the timber sales would “disrupt nesting migratory birds, killing some,”
thus violating section 703 of the MBTA.56 The Eighth Circuit disagreed
with NCWA, reasoning that “it would stretch [the MBTA] far beyond the
bounds of reason to construe it as an absolute criminal prohibition on
conduct, such as timber harvesting, that indirectly results in the death of
migratory birds.”57 Citing Seattle Audubon Society v. Evans, the Eighth
Circuit held that the ambiguous terms take and kill in 16 U.S.C. section
703 refer to the “physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers, conduct which was undoubtedly a concern at the time of the
statute's enactment in 1918.”58
C. The Case Note Focus: United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp
A surprise inspection in March 2002 revealed that two of CITGO’s
oil-water separator tanks were left uncovered.59 In 2007, a grand jury
indicted CITGO for misdemeanor violations of the MBTA, 16 U.S.C.
section 703.60 The government accused CITGO of “taking” a number of
migratory birds, including “five White Pelicans, twenty “regular old”
Ducks, two Northern Shoveler Ducks, four Double Crested Cormorants,
one Lesser Scaup Duck, one Black-Bellied Whistling Tree Duck, one
Blue-Winged Teal Duck, and one Fulvous Whistling Tree Duck.”61
At trial, the district court found CITGO guilty of three out of five
counts for “taking” migratory birds.62 Agreeing with the Tenth Circuit’s
reasoning in Apollo Energies, the district court found it obvious that
“unprotected oil field equipment can take or kill migratory birds.”63 The
district court ruled that the MBTA requires the defendant to proximately
55. Id. at 112.
56. Id. at 115.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 2015).
60. Id. at 488. CITGO was also convicted for violating the Clean Air Act based
on the said tanks being left open. The trial court found CITGO guilty of these charges.
United States v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp. 2d 841, 842 (S.D. Tex. 2012).
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit ruled CITGO not guilty of violating the Clean Air Act
because CITGO’s open-air equalization tanks were not oil-water separators under
Clean Air Act regulation and, therefore, did not require the tanks to be covered. United
States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 2015).
61. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 480 n.4 (5th Cir.
2015).
62. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d 841, 848 (S.D.
Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
63. Id. at 847 (quoting United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679,
686 (10th Cir. 2010)).
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cause the bird deaths to satisfy due process.64 In order to determine
proximate cause, the court had to determine whether it was reasonably
foreseeable that CITGO’s operation of open-air oil tanks would result in
bird deaths.65 In finding proximate cause existed, the district court held:
[N]ot only was it reasonably foreseeable that protected migratory
birds might become trapped in the layers of oil on top of Tanks
116 and 117, CITGO was aware that this was happening for years
and did nothing to stop it. CITGO’s unlawful, open-air oil tanks
proximately caused the deaths of migratory birds in violation of
the MBTA.66
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals overturned all of CITGO’s
convictions in September 2015, structuring its holding in four parts.67
First, the Fifth Circuit held that the MBTA’s text and the common law
origin of the word take limited prosecution of a “taking” to affirmative
actions that “reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human
control.”68 The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by ruling that courts assume
that Congress intends to use the common law definition of statutory terms,
unless there are “contrary indications.”69 The common law definition of
take, as applied to wildlife, means to “reduce those animals, by killing or
capturing, to human control.”70 Further, one does not reduce an animal to
human control “accidentally or by omission; he does so affirmatively.”71
The government argued that the common law definition of take was
not so limited in 1918.72 In doing so, the government listed every possible
definition of the term take in the 1920 edition of Webster’s dictionary. The
Fifth Circuit responded that simply because “take” may have alternative
meanings is not determinative; when the MBTA was originally passed, the
term “take” was a commonly understood term of art in the common law
when applied to wildlife.73 The Fifth Circuit further justified limiting take
to affirmative acts by comparing the MBTA’s definition to related
statute’s definitions.74 The ESA and the Marine Mammal Protection Act
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 848.
67. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 489–94 (5th Cir.
2015).
68. Id. at 489 (quoting Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a
Great Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
69. Id. (quoting United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 13 (1995)).
70. Id. at 489 (quoting Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 717).
71. Id.
72. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 2015).
73. Id. (internal citations omitted).
74. Id. at 490.
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(MMPA) both define take to include the acts of harassing or harming.75
Harass and harm are interpreted by the ESA and the MMPA to include
negligent acts that indirectly disturb animals, which is contrary to the
common law definition of take.76 Since the MBTA does not contain terms
like harm, or harass, or language signaling Congress’s intent to modify
the common law definition of take, the Fifth Circuit assumed take in the
MTBA should be read by its common law meaning.77
The government also argued that Congress expanded the definition of
take by negative implication. The argument goes as follows: in response
to a 2002 conviction of the U.S. military for accidentally killing birds
during training exercises, Congress authorized the accidental taking of
migratory birds for “military readiness activity.”78 Since Congress only
permitted military training activity, and not “operation of industrial
facilities,” to take migratory birds, the government argued that Congress
implicitly expanded take beyond its common-law meaning to cover
activities unrelated to hunting and trapping.79 The Fifth Circuit found the
argument to be illogical because Congress was addressing a narrow
military exception, not all military activities.80 Therefore, Congress had no
reason to address the full scope of the MBTA.81
Secondly, the Fifth Circuit refused to adopt the “broad readings” of
the MBTA adopted by the Second and Tenth circuits.82 These circuits hold
that because the MBTA imposes strict liability, “it must forbid acts that
accidentally or indirectly kill birds.”83 The Fifth Circuit cited U.S. v. FMC
Corp.84 and United States v. Apollo Energies,85 finding those cases’
interpretations of the MBTA to be “broad” and “counter-textual;”
therefore, it refused to adopt their holdings. 86 The court further reasoned
that neither of the decisions explored the meaning of take. Moreover, the
Fifth Circuit ruled that strict liability crimes, such as MBTA violations,
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 2015).
79. Id. at 490–491. Congress specifically stipulated that incidental takes caused
by the “operation of industrial activities” should not be exempted from MBTA
liability. See Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003,
Pub. L. No. 107-314, § 315(f)(2)(B), 116 Stat. 2458, 2509-10 (2002).
80. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 491.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 493.
83. Id. at 491.
84. 572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
85. 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010).
86. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 492 (5th Cir. 2015).
See supra Section Section II: The Circuit Split, Part 1 for a detailed discussion of FMC
Corp. and Apollo Energies.
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require a defendant commit the illegal act voluntarily.87 Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit solidified its stance on the MBTA’s scope by ending its
argument with: “[w]e agree with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, which,
recognizing this distinction, have placed decisive weight on the meaning
of ‘take.’”88
Next, the Fifth Circuit stated the district court incorrectly
distinguished the present case from similar oil field cases where MBTA
convictions were dropped89 because the conduct charged in CITGO’s
MBTA conviction also violated the Clean Air Act and Texas law.90 The
court pointed out two flaws in the district court’s distinction. First, the
Fifth Circuit stated that the MBTA’s text provides no basis for
criminalizing migratory bird deaths only because they resulted from
violations of other state or federal laws.91 Second, even if the MBTA did
provide such a basis, the Fifth Circuit reversed all of CITGO’s other
charges, and thus, the MBTA convictions must be overturned.92
Finally, the Fifth Circuit held that extending the scope of the MBTA
to all acts or omissions that directly kill birds would enable the government
to “prosecute at will and even capriciously.”93 In support, the court
discusses the amount of birds killed each year by windows,
communication towers, cars, and even cats. It then speculated that the
government could prosecute the owner of any of these if it began
“exercising its muscle to prevent ‘takings’ and ‘killings’ by regulating
every activity that proximately causes bird deaths.”94
III. ANALYSIS OF CITGO: WHERE WAS THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WRONG?
Prior to CITGO, the trend among courts was to expand the scope of the
MBTA to include accidental takings by corporate actors, so long as the
activity was both the actual and proximate cause of the taking.95 In siding with
the Eighth and Ninth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit opposed this trend and chose

87. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 492.
88. Id. at 493. See supra Section II: The Circuit Split, Part 2 for a detailed
discussion on the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s application of the MBTA.
89. See e.g., United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09–CR–0132, 2009 WL
3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009); United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F.
Supp.2d 1202 (D.N.D. Jan. 17, 2012); United States v. ConocoPhillips Co., Nos.
4:11–po–002 through 4:11–po–008, 2011 WL 4709887 (D.N.D. Aug. 10, 2011).
90. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 494.
94. Id.
95. See Ogden, supra note 19, at 27.
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to limit the MBTA’s misdemeanor liability to affirmative actions by human
beings.96 The following analysis examines each of CITGO’s four holdings.97
A. “Contrary Indications” of the Common Law Meaning of “Take”
The Fifth Circuit stated, “‘[a]bsent contrary indications,’ courts presume
that ‘Congress intends to adopt the common law definition of statutory
terms.’”98 The Fifth Circuit found no contrary indications and interpreted take
by its common law meaning—to “reduce those animals, by killing or
capturing, to human control.”99 However, this interpretation is incorrect as
there are at least “contrary indications” implying that Congress meant to
expand the term take to something more than affirmative actions by people,
such as hunting, shooting and capturing migratory birds. The language of the
MBTA makes it a crime to “pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill, attempt to take,
capture, or kill . . . ” any migratory bird.100 The Supreme Court is reluctant to
treat statutory terms as superfluous.101 If Congress truly intended take to mean
“to reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control,” then it
would have not also made it illegal to capture and/or kill migratory birds.102
Thus, Congress would have only made it illegal to take or attempt to take
migratory birds, since take, in the opinion of the Fifth Circuit, would
encompass killing or capturing.
Further, take logically means more than its common law meaning
because the origins of the MBTA were concerned with more than “curbing
overhunting.” The treaty that created the MBTA aimed to create a
“uniform system of protection” for all of the listed migratory birds, not
just those hunted.103 Thus, the treaty covers not only “Game Birds,” but
also “Nongame Birds,” and “Insectivorous Birds” which are not typically
hunted.104 Since the treaty covers more than Game Birds, it is reasonable
to believe that the MBTA is not solely concerned with affirmative human
96. See e.g., CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 494.
97. This article only examines CITGO’s MBTA holding. This article does not
explore CITGO’s analysis on the Clean Air Act convictions.
98. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 489 (quoting United States v. Shabani,
513 U.S. 10, 13 (1995)).
99. Id.
100. 16 U.S.C. § 703 (emphasis added).
101. See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great
Oregon, 515 U.S. 687, 698 (1995); Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc.,
486 U.S. 825, 837, n.11 (1988).
102. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697–98, 701–02 (construing “harm” in a manner that did
not “duplicate the meaning of other words” due to a “reluctance to treat statutory terms
as surplusage”).
103. Convention Between the United States and Great Britain for the Protection
of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702.
104. Id.
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actions—killing or capturing—that reduce birds to human control. Rather,
a more logical interpretation of take would include actions beyond the
affirmative human action of hunting. While the government raised this
argument in its brief, the court chose not address it.105 Instead, the court
stuck to its presumption, and based on the cases it cited and the common
law definition of take, found take in context of the MBTA to mean to
“reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control,” and
nothing more.106
The Fifth Circuit cites two Supreme Court cases, Babbitt v. Sweet
Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon107 and Geer v.
Connecticut108 to formulate its common law definition of take.109 The Fifth
Circuit cited the dissenting opinion in Babbitt, which discussed the ESA’s
definition of take,110 and applied this definition to the MBTA.111 There are
a number of problems with this analysis. First, the Fifth Circuit relied on
a dissenting opinion, which neither creates binding precedent nor becomes
a part of case law, to formulate its definition of take.112 Second, the ESA’s
definition of take is explicitly defined in the act,113 which deemed the
dissent’s definition for take irrelevant. The Supreme Court made the
following clear: “Congress explicitly defined the operative term “take” in
the ESA, no matter how much the dissent wishes otherwise . . . thereby
obviating the need for us to probe its meaning . . . .”114 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit’s contention that the dissent’s discussion of take was not criticized
in Sweet Home is contradictory to Sweet Home’s text.
The other case cited by the Fifth Circuit, Geer v. Connecticut,115 was
also improper for defining the term take in the MBTA. Geer was decided in
1896—twenty-two years before the MBTA was enacted. In fact, Geer was
decided before any federal laws protecting migratory birds were enacted in

105. Answering Brief of Plaintiff–Appellee at 59–60, United States v. CITGO
Petroleum Corp, 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-40128).
106. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493.
107. 515 U.S. 687 (1995).
108. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322
(1979).
109. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 489.
110. The dissent defines take as: “when applied to wild animals, [take] means to
reduce those animals, by killing or capturing, to human control.” See Babbitt, 515 U.S.
at 717.
111. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 489.
112. Id. (referring to Justice Scalia’s dissenting opinion in Babbitt, 515 U.S. at
717).
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) (2012).
114. Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 697 n.10.
115. Greer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled by Hughes v.
Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
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the United States. The first law of this sort, the Lacey Act,116 was enacted in
1900—four years after Geer was decided. Moreover, Geer questioned the
constitutionality of a Connecticut state law that made it unlawful to kill—
not take—and transport wild fowl over state lines.117 Geer did not interpret
a law that made it illegal to take migratory birds, and there were no federal
laws enacted at the time of Geer that made it illegal to take migratory birds.
Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit improperly cited Geer to justify take as a
well-understood term of art when the MBTA was enacted.
B. Reliance on Factually Distinguishable Jurisprudence
The Fifth Circuit refused to “adopt the broad, counter-textual reading
of the MBTA” by the Second and Tenth Circuits because an act to take
cannot be done unknowingly or involuntarily.118 Instead, CITGO adopted
the Eighth and Ninth Circuit’s understanding of the MBTA, requiring
defendants to take an affirmative action to cause migratory bird deaths.119
The main problem with CITGO relying on Seattle Audubon Society120
(Ninth Circuit) and Newton County Wildlife121 (Eighth Circuit) is the clear
factual distinction between these cases. The actions at issue in Newton
County Wildlife and Seattle Audubon Society involved logging sales “that
modified bird habitat in some way.”122 The facts of CITGO are instead
analogous to Apollo, as they both involve killing of migratory birds by oil
production equipment and notice to the defendant that their equipment
could cause bird deaths.123
The Apollo court noted the distinction between its own facts and the
facts of Newton County Wildlife and Seattle Audubon Society, and held the
distinction to be influential: “[W]hile the MBTA’s scope, like any statute,
can test the far reaches in application, we do not have that case before us.
The question here is whether unprotected oil field equipment can take or
kill migratory birds. It is obvious the oil equipment can.”124 Just as the
Apollo court found the distinguishable facts of the Seattle Audubon Society
and Newton County Wildlife dispositive, so should have the Fifth Circuit
116. 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378 (2012).
117. Geer, 161 U.S. at 521–22.
118. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 492–93 (5th Cir.
2015).
119. Id. at 493.
120. Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
121. Newton Cty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110 (8th Cir.
1997).
122. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686 (10th Cir. 2010).
123. Id. at 689–91; United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d
841, 848 (S.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
124. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d at 686.
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in CITGO. Instead, the CITGO court improperly rejected the persuasive
value of a conviction in the Tenth Circuit of an oil company whose
equipment led to the death of migratory birds.125
C. Improper Dependence on Clean Air Act Violations for a MBTA
Conviction
When the district court found CITGO in violation of the MBTA, it
noted that CITGO had also violated the Clean Air Act.126 The Fifth Circuit
found the district court decision flawed because the MBTA provides no
basis for criminalizing migratory bird killings that result from violations
of other laws. Further, the court held that, even if there was such a basis,
CITGO did not violate the Clean Air Act because its violation of the act
was also overturned on appeal.127
The Fifth Circuit wrongfully assumed the district court upheld the
MBTA convictions solely because CITGO had also violated other laws.128
The district court held that CITGO’s uncovered tanks were in violation of
the Clean Air Act, and that the resulting bird deaths violated the MBTA.129
Although the Fifth Circuit overturned CITGO’s Clean Air Act violations,
the MBTA violations should not have been overturned. The district court’s
MBTA violations were not a direct result of CITGO’s Clean Air Act
violations, but rather resulted because it was “reasonably foreseeable”
CITGO’s open oil tanks would result in bird deaths.130 Not only was it
reasonably foreseeable that birds could die as a result of the open tanks,
but evidence presented at trial established CITGO supervisors knew the
problem was happening. A CITGO employee testified:

125. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 493 (5th Cir. 2015).
126. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d at 847.
127. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493.
128. Id.
129. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d 841, 847–48
(S.D. Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
130. Id. at 847.
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He told his supervisor about dead ducks in Tanks 116 and 117 and
suggested that CITGO put roofs on the tanks. A number of
individuals who worked for a company that CITGO used to clean the
tanks also testified that their vacuum filters often got clogged with
bird bones and debris when they cleaned Tanks 116 and 117. . . . A
Process Engineering Group Leader at CITGO testified that he learned
that CITGO had an issue with birds getting into Tanks 116 and 117
from operators who came to him and said they didn't think they
should have birds in the tanks. He also saw three dead pelicans at one
time. He further testified that he remembered having discussions with
CITGO’s Environmental Manager about putting roofs on the tanks
in order to comply with the Clean Air Act and thought that would
also help keep birds out of the tanks.131
The district court held that “the migratory birds at the CITGO refinery
were killed as a direct result of being exposed to waste oil in uncovered
tanks—tanks that under the Clean Air Act were required to be covered.”132
CITGO’s MBTA violation was not contingent on whether their activities
violated the separate laws, but whether it was “reasonably foreseeable”
that CITGO’s unprotected oil field equipment could take or kill migratory
birds.133 The district court found this to be obvious.134 Therefore, it is
immaterial that the MBTA does not call for prosecution of an activity that
kills birds and violates separate laws. If it was reasonably foreseeable that
a certain activity would kill protected birds, these deaths should have been
prosecuted under the MBTA.
D. Unsupported Fear of Absurd MBTA Convictions
The Fifth Circuit believes Congress must have wanted the traditional
common law definition of take in order to deter absurd convictions;135
however, the Fifth Circuit cites no case law in support of its argument.
Rather, the court cites the toddler book “My Nest is Best,” and
hypothesizes the government prosecuting owners of everything from
communication towers to church steeples and even cats in order to exercise
its muscle.136 Fear of the government overstepping its boundaries is a

131. Id. at 848 (internal citations omitted).
132. Id. at 847 (emphasis added).
133. Id. (quoting United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679, 686
(10th Cir. 2010)).
134. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d 841, 846 (S.D.
Tex. 2012), rev’d, 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
135. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 494.
136. Id. at 494, n.16.
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growing trend as of late.137 However, it is difficult to imagine the
government “capriciously” prosecuting car, cat, and church steeple owners
for activities that kill protected birds.138 Prosecutorial discretion is not
unlimited, and prosecutors may not engage in “selective prosecution,
which denies equal protection of the law, or vindictive prosecution, which
violates due process rights.”139 Prosecutorial discretion can and should be
relied on to prevent absurd convictions. To date, prosecutors have resisted
convicting purely technical violations of the MBTA, such as migratory
birds being killed by cars, planes, house windows, and cats.140
While prosecutorial discretion is sufficient to prevent absurd convictions,
steps must be taken to limit relying on such a method. Giving prosecutors free
rein to convict under a broad law like the MBTA creates concerns of
inconsistent MBTA convictions.141 Theoretically, prosecutorial discretion
could shift as administrations and their objectives change.142 For example, in
2012, Republican Senators David Vitter (R-La.) and Lamar Alexander (RTenn.) wrote a letter to Attorney General Eric Holder, arguing MBTA
prosecutions under the Obama administration have discriminately targeted oil
and gas production companies, while wind farms have been given leniency.143
Further, scholars suggest a lack of uniformity in MBTA prosecutions could
impede businesses from developing in some areas of the country.144
137. See, e.g., William J. Olsen, Warning: Obama Might Have Just Figured Out
How To Take Your Guns Away, W. JOURNALISM (Apr. 22, 2014), http://www
.westernjournalism.com/atf-regulations-designed-disqualify-many-gun-ownership/
[https://perma.cc/U9MT-C84H].
138. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 493 (“This scope of strict criminal
liability would enable the gove rnment to prosecute at will and e ven
capriciously . . . ”).
139. Article: II. Preliminary Proceedings, 43 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC.
247 (2014) (internal citations omitted).
140. See Marc R. Greenberg, Captain “Sully” Sullenberger, Charles Dickens, and
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (A.B.A.), Spring 2010, at 12.
(noting that after US Airways Flight 1549 landed in the Hudson River, the DOJ found
it prudent not to charge the captain with violating the MBTA, even though his plane’s
engines had ingested a flock of Canada geese, a species protected under the law).
141. See, e.g., Ashley R. Fiest, Defining the Wingspan of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, 47 AKRON L. REV. 587, 606 (2014).
142. Benjamin Means, Prohibiting Conduct, Not Consequences: The Limited
Reach of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 97 MICH. L. REV. 823, 83435 (1998).
143. U.S. Senate Committee on Environment & Public Works, Vitter, Alexander
Demand a Clear Migratory Bird Policy from Justice Department (Jan. 30, 2013),
http://www.epw.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases-republican?ID
=8C84134D-A36C-2155-A554-DC81EADED88A [https://perma.cc/T7YD-D5N9].
It should be noted that Duke Energy, a Wyoming wind farm, was charged with
violating the MBTA in 2013, stemming from the deaths of 14 Golden Eagles and 149
other protected birds. See United States v. Duke Energy Renewables, Inc., No. 2:13
-cr-00268, 2013 BL (D. Wyo., Nov. 22, 2013).
144. Fiest, supra note 142, at 608.
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Relying on prosecutorial discretion can create a “blank check,”
allowing courts to avoid establishing a concrete rule on how the MBTA
should be applied.145 A lack of certainty as to the MBTA’s scope has led
federal courts to the current circuit split on the MBTA’s application. Thus,
federal courts and the prosecutors need guidance on what is a violation of
the MBTA.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Having concluded that courts should not rely solely on prosecutorial
discretion in determining what constitutes MBTA violations, the
following section explores administrative and judicial solutions to provide
courts and prosecutors guidance. When exploring regulatory solutions, it
is appropriate to consult a recent FWS notice of intent to authorize
incidental takings of migratory birds. Additionally, this article also
explores the FWS’s constitutional authority to interpret the MBTA to
apply to accidental killings by commercial actors.
A. Administrative Solution: Incidental Take Permits
The FWS—the agency charged with enforcing the MBTA—has the
authority to issue permits to natural and juridical persons for accidentally
taking birds. This authority covers any activity that would normally violate
the MBTA.146 There are a variety of authorized permits, including those
for bird banding and marking, scientific collection, taxidermy, and
falconry.147 The FWS has also issued incidental take permits to the Armed
Forces for activities that may accidentally kill birds during military
training.148 Moreover, there exist “special purpose permits” that cover
activities “outside the scope of the standard form permits” for the
MBTA.149 An applicant for a “special purpose permit” must make a
“sufficient showing of benefit to the migratory bird resource, important
research reasons, reasons of human concern for individual birds, or other
compelling justification.”150
145. Fiest, supra note 141, at 606–07 (quoting Norman L. Reimer, When It Comes
to Overcriminalization, Prosecutorial Discretion Is for the Birds, THE CHAMPION,
Oct. 2012, at 9).
146. 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.1–22.61 (2014).
147. 50 C.F.R. §§ 21.21–22.31. Falconry is the “sport of hunting with falcons or
other birds of prey; the keeping and training of such birds. NEW OXFORD AMERICAN
DICTIONARY 623 (3d ed. 2010). End quotes are missing here. Don’t assume, let the
EIC tell you where it goes.
148. 50 C.F.R. § 21.15.
149. 50 C.F.R. § 21.27.
150. Id.
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Many scholars have suggested that the FWS should force corporations
that put birds at risk to apply for these incidental take permits.151 In
exchange for a permit to kill protected birds, the corporations would have
to mitigate certain risks that they create for protected birds.152
Coincidentally, in May 2015, the FWS released a notice of intent to
evaluate potential environmental impacts of authorizing accidental deaths
of migratory birds under the MBTA.153
1. Fish and Wildlife Service’s Proposal to Authorize Incidental
Takings
In the FWS’s notice of intent to evaluate the impact of authorizing
takings, the agency proposed four specific regulatory approaches to
authorize takings. Three of the prospective approaches would be
mandatory requirements, while the fourth would be voluntary.
The first approach, “General Conditional Authorization for Incidental
Take Associated With Particular Sectors,” would establish a general
authorization to take birds for certain industries and hazards that have
historically harmed birds, in exchange for adherence to certain procedures
that have been developed to address practices or structures that effect
birds.154 The second approach, “Individual Permits,”155 seeks to establish
the authority to issue take permits for activities not covered under the first
approach.156 The third approach, “Memoranda of Understanding With
Federal Agencies,” would establish a procedure for authorizing incidental
take permits to federal agencies in exchange for a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) to the FWS. The last approach, “Development of
Voluntary Guidance for Industry Sectors,” would involve the FWS
working with interested industry sectors to develop ways their operations
and facilities could mitigate migratory bird risks.157 This approach does
not seek to give incidental take permits, “but would, as a matter of lawenforcement discretion, consider the extent to which a company or

151. See, e.g., Ogden, supra note 19, at, 53; Robyn Rose, A Special Purpose: The
Migratory Bird Treaty Act and Wind Energy, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 205, 225 (2014).
152. Id.
153. Migratory Bird Permits; Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, 80
Fed. Reg. 30032 (May 26, 2015) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 21) [hereinafter
Migratory Bird Impact Statement].
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. Unlike the first approach which would issue permits to take birds for
certain industries, this approach only seeks the authority to do so.
157. Id.
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individual had complied with that guidance as a substantial factor in
assessing any potential enforcement action for violation of the Act.”158
There are benefits to the implementation of each of the FWS’s
mandatory incidental take permit application approaches. Nevertheless, if
the FWS were to implement one of the authorized take proposals, it should
be the first approach, “General Conditional Authorization for Incidental
Take Associated With Particular Sectors.” The FWS’s first approach best
suits the purpose of the MBTA—the protection of migratory birds—while
providing fair notice of what is expected of corporate actors. The FWS
provides a list of specific industries and hazards that they are concerned
with, including: oil, gas, and wastewater pits; oil production gas burning
pipes; communication towers; and power lines.159 However, noticeably
absent from this list is wind energy.160 It is crucial that the FWS includes
wind energy as an industry required to apply for incidental take permits.
Wind farms, which have been described as “bird blender[s],”161 pose
a great threat to migratory birds. As previously discussed, studies predict
that wind farms kill as many as 368,000 birds annually.162 For example, in
United States v. Duke Energy Renewables, Inc.,163 the owner of two
Wyoming wind energy projects was convicted of violating the MBTA,
stemming from the deaths of fourteen Golden Eagles and 149 other
protected birds.164 Currently, wind farms are not governed by a mandatory
regulation scheme that requires them to actively mitigate bird deaths.165 In
2012, the FWS published the Land-Based Wind Energy Guidelines to
address the increasing problem of bird deaths.166 However, the Wind

158. Id.
159. Migratory Bird Impact Statement, supra note 153.
160. Id. The FWS’s notice of intent states “We may seek to develop additional
general authorizations in this rulemaking for hazards to birds associated with other
industry sectors. We are considering, for example, whether a general conditional
authorization can be developed for hazards to birds related to wind energy
generation[.]”
161. Mike Barnard, Want to Save 70 Million Birds a Year? Build More Wind
Farms,RENEWECONOMY (Aug. 10, 2012), http://reneweconomy.com.au/2012/wantto-save-70-million-birds-a-year-build-more-wind-farms-18274 [https://perma.cc/
6F2D-WMZA].
162. Hughes, supra note 25.
163. No. 2:13-cr-00268, 2013 BL (D. Wyo., Nov. 22, 2013).
164. United States v. Duke Energy Renewables, Inc., No. 2:13-cr-00268, 2013
BL (D. Wyo., Nov. 22, 2013).
165. U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. FISH AND W ILDLIFE SERVICE LANDBASED WIND ENERGY GUIDELINES (2012), http://www.fws.gov/windenergy/docs/
weg_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/WP2U-4DEB] [hereinafter W IND E NERGY
GUIDELINES].
166. Id.
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Energy Guidelines are purely voluntary and non-binding.167 Since
voluntary guidelines for these bird blenders would be unenforceable, they
are simply unacceptable; therefore, the FWS must include the wind energy
industry in its regulations.
The second approach proposed by the FWS—“individual permits”—
would establish legal authority and standards which authorize takes for
activities not historically thought to put migratory birds at risk. The
consideration for take permits would go to projects that require projectspecific considerations, and projects with little information regarding their
adverse effects on migratory birds.168 The FWS would conduct sitespecific reviews to determine whether a permit should be issued for each
applicant.169 The FWS would not be bound to issue permits to all persons
who apply, but would simply have the legal authority to do so if certain
standards established by FWS were met.170
While the activities covered by the second approach should be entitled
to the same protections as the usual suspects,171 the FWS’s statement “we
do not intend to issue any actual individual permits as part of this action”
is concerning. The FWS must make the requirements for obtaining an
incidental take permit clear in order to avoid prejudicial allocation of
permits. Moreover, the FWS should not expect every person or business
that may incidentally take migratory birds to apply for a permit.172
The third approach—“Memoranda of Understanding With Federal
Agencies”—would establish a procedure to authorize incidental takes for
federal agencies that submit a MOU with the FWS.173 The federal agency’s
MOU would “consider the impacts to migratory birds in their actions and
to mitigate that take appropriately.”174 In 2001, President Clinton issued
an executive order requiring federal agencies likely to have a measurable
negative effect on migratory bird populations to enter into a MOU “that
167. Id. (“These voluntary Guidelines provide a structured, scientific process for
addressing wildlife conservation concerns at all stages of land-based wind energy
development.”).
168. Id.; Migratory Bird Impact Statement, supra note 153.
169. Migratory Bird Impact Statement, supra note 153.
170. Id. (“Our intention would be only to establish the authority and standards
for issuance of individual permits in this rulemaking; we do not intend to issue
any actual individual permits as part of this action.”).
171. Oil and gas industries, communication towers, electric transmission and
distribution lines, and so on.
172. The FWS mirrors this statement in its introductory statement. “[W]e
would not expect every person or business that may incidentally take migratory
birds to obtain a permit, nor would we intend to expand our judicious use of our
enforcement authority under the MBTA.” Migratory Bird Impact Statement,
supra note 153.
173. Id.
174. Id.
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shall promote the conservation of migratory bird populations” with the
FWS.175 The third approach would give the FWS the authority to exchange
incidental take permits for MOUs—something not done under President
Clinton’s 2001 executive order.176 The third approach raises the same
concerns as the second approach in that neither approach sets forth a
definite method to obtain an incidental take permit. Both approaches only
give the FWS the authority to authorize incidental take permits. Allowing
the FWS too much discretion in allocating incidental take permits would
certainly lead to parties claiming that they were discriminated against
when denied an incidental take permit.
The last approach by the FWS—“Development of Voluntary Guidance
for Industry Sectors”—should not be favored over an approach making
application for incidental take permits mandatory. A voluntary approach
would not solve the ambiguity of whether the MBTA applies to incidental
takes by commercial actors. Furthermore, offering prosecutorial discretion
instead of an incidental take permit would only prevent absurd MBTA
prosecutions. Prosecutorial discretion would not resolve the ambiguity in the
MBTA’s application in federal courts.
Currently, the FWS has not implemented any of the proposed
approaches to authorized bird takes. Should the FWS choose to force
certain corporations to apply for incidental take permits, as many scholars
have suggested, it is sensible that the FWS would do so through one of the
proposed approaches in its notice of intent to evaluate the impacts of
authorized takes.
Forcing corporations to apply for incidental take permits would allow
corporations to accidentally kill migratory birds while still complying with
the MBTA.177 Moreover, the FWS would make it known that the MBTA
applies to accidental, direct killings by corporate actors, solving the
conflict facing corporations and courts alike.
If the FWS authorizes incidental take permits to corporate actors who
mitigate bird deaths, it stands to reason that the FWS intends to prosecute
corporate actors who do not choose to mitigate risks to protected birds.
Should the FWS require corporate actors to apply for incidental take
permits, the FWS would implicitly interpret the MBTA to apply to
incidental takes. Parties who believe take and kill apply only to conduct
directed against wildlife (hunting, poaching, and so on) may argue FWS
175. Exec. Order No. 13186 §§ 2(c) & 3(a), 66 Fed. Reg. 3853 (Jan. 10, 2001).
The Executive Order also clarified that the MBTA applies to intentional and
unintentional taking, and defined “unintentional take” as that which “results from,
but is not the purpose of, the activity in question.”
176. Migratory Bird Impact Statement, supra note 153.
177. See Robyn Rose, A Special Purpose: The Migratory Bird Treaty Act and
Wind Energy, 55 NAT. RESOURCES J. 205, 225 (2014).
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does not have the legal authority to expand the MBTA’s scope to include
activities that incidentally kill migratory birds, since this is a job normally
left to the legislature. Therefore, an analysis of the FWS’s authority to
interpret the MBTA is appropriate.
2. The FWS’s Authority to Interpret the MBTA: Chevron Deference
vs. Rule of Lenity
Chevron deference is the administrative law principal requiring courts
to defer to interpretations of statutes made by the government agencies
charged with enforcing them, as long as the interpretation is reasonable.178
In order for an agency interpretation to obtain Chevron deference, a court
must determine two things. First, the court must determine Congress has
not “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”179 If Congress has
directly spoken to the issue, its intent is clear and must be followed.180
Second, if the statute is silent or ambiguous regarding a specific issue, the
court must determine whether the agency’s interpretation is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.181
Congress has not spoken to the precise question of whether the MBTA
applies to incidental takes. As evidenced by the circuit split,182 the MBTA
is ambiguous as to whether it applies to incidental takes by commercial
actors. Therefore, the first prong of the Chevron deference test would be
satisfied. Next, a court must decide whether the FWS’s answer to the
incidental take issue is “based on a permissible construction of the
statute.”183 Should the FWS pass one of its proposals requiring
corporations to apply for incidental take permits, the FWS would be
interpreting the MBTA to apply to incidental takings. This interpretation
would not be impermissible or unreasonable. In fact, two federal circuit
courts of appeals and numerous district court judges have already held the
MBTA applies to incidental takes.184 Therefore, should the FWS require
certain corporations to apply for incidental take permits, courts would
likely find this permissible under Chevron deference.
The FWS seeks to implement incidental take permits in order to
reinforce its position “that the MBTA applies to take that occurs incidental
178. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
179. Id. at 842.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 843.
182. See supra Section II: The Circuit Split.
183. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 843–44.
184. See supra Section II: The Circuit Split, Part 1: The Second and Tenth
Circuit. See also United States v. Moon Lake 45 F. Supp.2d, 1070, 1074 (D. Colo.
1999) (Congress intended to “prohibit conduct beyond that normally exhibited by
hunters and poachers.”).
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to, and which is not the purpose of, an otherwise lawful activity . . . .” 185
Normally when an administrative agency reasonably interprets an
ambiguous law, such interpretation is entitled to Chevron deference by the
court.186 However, the MBTA is a criminal statute, and criminal statues
are subject to the rule of lenity.187 The relationship between the rule of
lenity and Chevron deference has been the subject of recent debate.188
As the U.S. Supreme Court explained, “[t]he rule of lenity requires
ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants
subject to them.”189 The policy behind the rule of lenity is that the
legislature, not executive officers, defines crimes.190 Moreover, the rule of
lenity “promotes fair notice of prohibited conduct and reduces the
likelihood that unintentionally criminal conduct will be penalized.”191
However, the rule applies only if there remains uncertainty in a statute
after review of its text, structure, history, and purpose.192
Multiple courts have invoked the rule of lenity when ruling on the
application of the MBTA.193 Most courts cite the rule of lenity to support
the MBTA being interpreted narrowly; therefore, it does not apply to
accidental takes by corporations.194 Should the FWS choose to interpret
the MBTA, courts would face the issue of whether the FWS’s
interpretation of the MBTA is entitled to Chevron deference, or whether
the rule of lenity prevails.
This issue is largely unsettled. Supporters of a FWS interpretation
receiving Chevron deference would cite Babbitt,195 where the Supreme
Court provides,“[w]e have never suggested that the rule of lenity should
provide the standard for reviewing facial challenges to administrative
185. Migratory Bird Impact Statement, supra note 153 (“We seek to provide
legal clarity to Federal and State agencies, industry, and the public regarding
compliance with the MBTA.”).
186. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., 467 U.S. at 842–43.
187. Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 736 F.3d 722, 729 (6th Cir. 2013).
188. See, e.g., Jason W. McElroy, Lenity And Deference On A Collision Course,
Law 360 (Feb. 26, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/625152/lenity-anddeference-on-a-collision-course [https://perma.cc/F5KN-TMEL].
189. United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
190. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 353 (2014).
191. United States v. Hartec Enters., Inc., 967 F.2d 130, 133 (5th Cir. 1992) (citing
United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952 (1988)).
192. Barber v. Thomas, 560 U.S. 474, 474 (2010).
193. See United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09–CR–0132, 2009 WL
3645170 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009); United States v. Brigham Oil & Gas, L.P., 840 F.
Supp.2d 1202, 1211 (D.N.D. 2012); United States v. Corbin Farm Serv., 444 F. Supp.
510, 529 (E.D. Cal. 1978).
194. United States v. Chevron USA, Inc., No. 09-CR-0132, 2009 WL 3645170, at
*3 (W.D. La. Oct. 30, 2009); Brigham Oil & Gas, 840 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.
195. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Oregon, 515
U.S. 687, 704 n.18 (1995).
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regulations whenever the governing statute authorizes criminal
enforcement.”196 Those opposing a FWS interpretation would attempt to
disprove Babbitt by citing Whitman v. United States.197 In the Supreme
Court’s denial of certiorari, the Court held the Babbit court’s statement
regarding the rule of lenity “contradicts the many cases before and since
holding that, if a law has both criminal and civil applications, the rule of
lenity governs its interpretation in both settings.”198 Opponents of the FWS
interpretation would also cite the concurrence in Carter v. Welles-Bowen
Realty, Inc.,199 where Judge Sutton explored the balance between the rule
of lenity and Chevron deference.200 The Carter court found it unlikely that
the Babbitt footnote intended to overrule previous laws regarding the rule
of lenity.201
The proponents of FWS regulations interpreting the MBTA may finally
argue that the nondelegation doctrine occasionally allows Congress to transfer
some responsibility for defining crimes to an administrative agency.202 For
Congress to do so, it must speak distinctly.203 Judge Sutton referred to this as
the “clear-statement rule.”204 The text of the MBTA specifically authorizes
the Secretary of the Interior “to issue such regulations as may be necessary to
implement the provisions of the [MBTA] convention.”205 Additionally, the
MBTA specifically authorizes and directs the Secretary of the Interior:
[T]o determine when, to what extent, if at all, and by what means,
it is compatible with the terms of the conventions to allow hunting,
taking, capture, killing, . . . of any such bird . . . and to adopt
suitable regulations permitting and governing the same, in
accordance with such determinations, which regulations shall
become effective when approved by the President.206
196. Id. at 704 n.18.
197. 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014).
198. Id. at 353–54.
199. 736 F.3d 722 (6th Cir. 2013) (Sutton, concurring).
200. Id. at 729–35.
201. Id. at 735.
202. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (held that Congress could
make it a crime to violate regulations issued by the Secretary of Agriculture); Touby
v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991) (holding that Congress could delegate power to
the Attorney General for temporary scheduling of controlled substances); United
States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997) (holding the Securities and Exchange
Commission could, through legislation, authorize rules combating securities fraud and
criminalizing violations of these rules).
203. Carter, 736 F.3d at 733 (quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,
519; United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892)).
204. Id.
205. 16 U.S.C. § 712(2) (2012).
206. Id. § 704(a) (2012) (emphasis added).
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Congress made it clear that the administering agency of the MBTA—
the Secretary of the Interior, which in turn delegates power to the FWS—
is distinctly given the power to implement regulations it deems fit to
enforce the MBTA.
The courts have not squarely settled the issue of Chevron deference
versus the rule of lenity. The most persuasive authority on the issue comes
from a Supreme Court denial of certiorari207 and an appellate court’s
concurring opinion.208 In regards to the present issue, the face of the MBTA
seems to “distinctly” give FWS the authority to define criminal conduct.209
Therefore, a reasonable interpretation of the MBTA by the FWS should be
entitled to Chevron deference.
If the FWS adopts incidental take regulations under the MBTA, those
regulations would be vulnerable to challenge in the Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth
Circuits (and other courts that reason that the MBTA does not apply to
accidental killings by commercial actors). The Supreme Court could save
courts and scholars the grief of determining what deference should be given
to a FWS interpretation of the MBTA by granting CITGO certiorari and
determining if the law applies to accidental takes by corporate actors.
B. Judicial Solution
The current federal circuit split indicates that the interpretation of the
MBTA is ripe for Supreme Court or en banc review. Before the Fifth
Circuit overturned the district court’s decision in CITGO,210 several courts
and scholars felt that the MBTA applied to accidental killings or takings,
subject to limitations of actual and proximate cause.211 However, the
recent CITGO decision opposed this trend.212
It is unclear at this time whether the government will file a writ of
certiorari. Should the Supreme Court choose to hear CITGO, or any other
case regarding the application of the MBTA, the Court should follow the
holding of the Tenth Circuit in Apollo Energies.213 Such a ruling would
hold corporate actors responsible for bird deaths as long as the actor
proximately caused the death. Moreover, it must be foreseeable that a
defendant’s actions could cause bird deaths, and thereby, are subject to
MBTA convictions. In order to provide fair notice of what sort of activities
207. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352 (2014).
208. See e.g., Carter, 736 F.3d 722.
209. 16 U.S.C. §§ 712(2), 704(a).
210. United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 893 F. Supp.2d 841 (S.D. Tex.
2012), rev’d, 801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
211. See Ogden, supra note 19, at 48.
212. CITGO Petroleum Corp., 801 F.3d at 494.
213. United States v. Apollo Energies, Inc., 611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
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are subject to MBTA convictions, the FWS should create regulations
requiring certain industries that put birds at risk to apply for incidental take
permits.
V. CONCLUSION
The MBTA is an important law that affects many industries vital to
Fifth Circuit states. When faced with two competing views of the MBTA’s
application, the Fifth Circuit took the wrong path. The MBTA must be
interpreted to apply to incidental killings and takings of protected birds,
subject to proximate cause limitations. Moreover, the FWS must
implement mandatory regulations requiring corporations who put birds at
risk to apply for incidental take permits. Doing so would not only inform
the court and corporations of what is permissible under the MBTA, but it
would also mitigate many inevitable bird deaths.
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